Justification Logic studies epistemic and provability phenomena by introducing justifications/proofs into the language in the form of justification terms. Pure justification logics serve as counterparts of traditional modal epistemic logics, and hybrid logics combine epistemic modalities with justification terms. The computational complexity of pure justification logics is typically lower than that of the corresponding modal logics. Moreover, the so-called reflected fragments, which still contain complete information about the respective justification logics, are known to be in NP for a wide range of justification logics, pure and hybrid alike. This paper shows that, under reasonable additional restrictions, these reflected fragments are NP-complete, thereby proving a matching lower bound. The proof method is then extended to provide a uniform proof that the corresponding full pure justification logics are Π p 2 -hard, reproving and generalizing an earlier result by Milnikel.
Introduction
Justification Logic is an emerging field that studies provability, knowledge, and belief via explicit proofs or justifications that are part of the language. A justification logic is essentially a refined analogue of a modal epistemic logic. Whereas the latter uses F to indicate that F is known to be true, a justification logic uses t : F instead, where t is a term that describes a 'justification' or proof of F. This construction enables justification logics to reason about both formulas and proofs at the same time, avoiding the need to treat provability at the metalevel.
Because Justification Logic can reason directly about explicit proofs, it provides more concrete and constructive analogues of modal epistemic logics. For example, the modal distribution axiom (F → G) → ( F → G) is replaced in Justification Logic by the axiom s : (F → G) → (t : F → (s · t) : G). The latter replaces the distribution axiom with a computationally explicit construction. Justification logics are very promising for structural proof theory and have already proved to be fruitful in finding new approaches to common knowledge ( [3] ), the Logical Omniscience Problem ( [6] ), and self-referentiality of proofs ( [19] ). For further discussion on the various applications of Justification Logic, see [5] .
The goal of the present paper 3 is to provide a uniform method of proving lower bounds for the Derivability Problems in various justification logics and their reflected fragments by reduction from problems similar to the Vertex Cover Problem. We begin by reviewing some definitions of justification logics.
The historically first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs LP, was introduced by Sergei Artemov [1] to provide a provability semantics for the modal logic S4 (see also [2] ). The language of LP
contains an additional operator t : F, read 'term t serves as a justification/proof of formula F. ' Here p stands for a sentence letter, x for a justification variable, and c for a justification constant. Formulas of the form t : F are called justification assertions.
Statements t : F can be seen as refinements of modal statements F because the latter say that F is known, whereas the former additionally provide a rationale for such knowledge. This relationship is demonstrated through the recursively defined operation of forgetful projection that maps justification formulas to modal formulas: (t : 
A5. Positive Introspection Axiom t : F → ! t : t : F;

R4. Axiom Internalization Rule c : A ,
where A is an axiom of LP and c is a justification constant. LP is the exact counterpart of S4 (note the similarity of their axioms): namely, let X • = {F • | F ∈ X} for a set X of justification formulas and let LP be identified with the set of its theorems, then Theorem 1 (Realization Theorem, [1, 2] ). LP • = S4. 
JD, JD4
Other epistemic modal logics have their own justification counterparts in the same sense. Counterparts of the modal logics K, D, T, K4, and D4 were developed by Vladimir Brezhnev in [9] . These justification logics, named J, JD, JT, J4, and JD4 respectively, are all subsystems of LP and share the A1-A3 portion of its axiom system. The remaining two axiom schemes are included dependent on whether or not their forgetful projections are axioms of the respective modal logic. In addition, JD and JD4 require a new axiom scheme: 4 
A7. Consistency t : ⊥ → ⊥,
whose forgetful projection is the modal Seriality Axiom. Complete details can be found in Table 1 . Finally, the rule R4 for J4 and JD4 is written the same way as for LP, but of course it now applies to the axioms of J4, respectively JD4. The logics without the Positive Introspection Axiom A5 still require some restricted form of positive introspection for constants which is embedded into the Axiom Internalization Rule: where A is an axiom of the logic, c is a justification constant, and n ≥ 0 is an integer. This form of the Axiom Internalization Rule is used for J, JD, and JT. Theorem 2 (Realization Theorem, [9] ). All these justification logics are pure in the sense that only terms are present in the language, but not modalities. In [3] , Artemov studied hybrid justification logics T n LP, S4 n LP, and S5 n LP. These combine terms with modalities for several agents (a singleagent variant S4 1 LP was originally developed by Artemov jointly with Elena Nogina, see [7] ).
Axioms and rules of T n LP, S4 n LP, and S5 n LP: Let ML ∈ {T, S4, S5}.
1. Axioms and rules of the multimodal logic ML n .
2. Axioms and rules of the justification logic LP.
3. Connection axiom. For each i = 1, . . . , n, t : F → i F. The Axiom Internalization Rule R4 in 2. is extended to apply to all axioms of ML n LP.
For some applications (e.g., to avoid Logical Omniscience [6] or to study selfreferentiality [19] ) the use of constants needs to be restricted; this is achieved using constant specifications. A constant specification CS for a justification logic JL is a set of instances of the rule R4 for this logic:
Given a constant specification CS for JL, the logic JL CS is the result of replacing the Axiom Internalization Rule in JL (R4 or R4 ! ) by its relativized version, respectively by:
where n ≥ 0 is an integer.
The Realization Theorem holds for a pure justification logic JL with a constant specification CS, i.e., (JL CS )
Definition 3. A constant specification CS for a logic JL is called:
• axiomatically appropriate 5 if every axiom of JL is justified by at least one constant;
• schematic 6 if each constant justifies several (maybe 0) axiom schemes and only them;
• schematically injective 7 if it is schematic and each constant justifies no more than one axiom scheme.
The following is the fundamental property of justification logics, closely related to the Realization Theorem: Lemma 4 (Constructive Necessitation. [1, 3, 4] ). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for a justification logic JL. For any theorem F of JL CS , there exists a +-free ground 8 justification term s such that JL CS ⊢ s : F. 5 The term is due to Melvin Fitting. 6 The term is due to Robert Milnikel although the idea goes back to Alexey Mkrtychev. 7 The term is due to Milnikel. 8 A justification term is called ground if it contains no occurrences of justification variables.
Whereas it is well known that the Derivability Problems for the modal logics K, D, T, K4, D4, and S4 are PSPACE-complete ( [20] ), it was shown that Theorem 5 ([15, 18] 
Definition 7.
For any justification logic JL CS with a constant specification CS, the reflected fragment of the logic consists of all provable justification assertions:
We will write rJL CS ⊢ t : F to mean t : F ∈ rJL CS . At the end of this section, we will present an axiomatization for several reflected fragments via * -calculi, which would make the use of ⊢ more natural.
A reflected fragment bears complete information about the underlying logic as the following theorem shows: Theorem 8 ( [14, 17] ). Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP} and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL. Then
(The requirement of axiomatic appropriateness is necessary only for the =⇒-direction.)
The =⇒-direction constitutes the Constructive Necessitation Property (Lemma 4). The ⇐=-direction easily follows from the Factivity Axiom A4 for all logics but J, JD, J4, and JD4 that do not have Factivity. For these four logics, the statement can be proved semantically using F-models (see [12] for their description) or syntactically by transforming a derivation of t : F in the respective * -calculus into a derivation of F in the underlying justification logic (the details of this transformation can be found in [17, proof of Lemma 3.4.10]).
Theorem 9 ([14, 17] ). Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP} and CS be a schematic constant specification for JL. The Derivability Problem for rJL CS , the reflected fragment of JL CS , is in NP. In [17] , this calculus was shown to also axiomatize the logics rJ4 CS , rJD4 CS , rT n LP CS , rS4 n LP CS , and rS5 n LP CS . In particular, the three logics LP CS , J4 CS , and JD4 CS all use the * ! CS -calculus to axiomatize their reflected fragments. The reflected fragments rJ CS , rJD CS , and rJT CS of the three theories which do not have positive introspection are all axiomatized by the * CS -calculus which is obtained by omitting the rule * A5 from the * ! CS -calculus while simultaneously extending the set of axioms to include: * CS ! . Axioms: for any c : A ∈ CS and any integer n ≥ 0, ! ! · · · ! Note that axioms * CS are instances of * CS ! with n = 0. Therefore, * CS can be used both in the * CS -and the * ! CS -calculi.
We collectively call the * CS -and the * ! CS -calculi the * -calculi, which are summarized in Table 2 . As can be seen from the preceding discussion and the summarizing table, there are only two calculi that axiomatize the reflected fragments of various pure and hybrid justification logics. More precisely, the rules of the * -calculus for a given justification logic JL CS depend solely on whether JL enjoys full positive introspection while the axioms of this * -calculus are read from CS and thus indirectly depend on the axioms of JL.
In Theorem 36 below, we will show that the same rules can be used in the setting where there are non-logical axioms in addition to the * CS or * CS ! axioms. The first main result of the present paper, Theorem 32, is a lower bound on the complexity of reflected fragments that matches the upper bound of Theorem 9; namely, we show that the Derivability Problems for many reflected fragments are NP-complete. The proof is by a many-one polynomial-time reduction from a known NP-complete problem, the Vertex Cover Problem. As in Milnikel's lower bound for LP CS , we have to impose an additional restriction that CS be axiomatically appropriate and schematically injective. The reduction method is then extended to establish a lower bound on the complexity of full pure justification logics that also matches the upper bound of Theorem 5; this gives a reproof of the Π p 2 -hardness results of [21] and extends the results to additional justification logics.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines a coding of graphs by propositional formulas and shows how the existence of a vertex cover can be described in terms of these formulas. Section 3 develops justification terms that encode several standard methods of propositional reasoning. Although the formulas that describe the existence of a vertex cover depend on the cover itself rather than only on its size, Sect. 4 shows how to eliminate this dependency by using the terms from Sect. 3 to encode particular derivations of the formulas from Sect. 2. Section 5 finishes the proof of the polynomial-time reduction. This reduction is used in Sect. 6 to establish a criterion for NP-hardness of reflected fragments and to apply it to a wide range of them. Section 7 lays the groundwork for proving lower bounds for full pure justification logics, which is done in Sect. 8 by generalizing the Vertex Cover Problem to a Π p 2 -complete version. Finally, Sect. 9 explores the restrictions on the constant specification necessary for the proved lower bounds.
Graph Coding and Preliminaries
A graph G = V, E has a finite set V of vertices and a finite set E of undirected edges. We assume w.l.o.g. that V = {1, . . . , N} for some N and represent an edge e between vertices k and l as the set e = {k, l} with its endpoints denoted by v 1 (e) < v 2 (e). A vertex cover for G is a set C of vertices such that each edge e ∈ E has at least one endpoint in C. The Vertex Cover (VC) Problem is the problem of determining whether a given graph G has a vertex cover of a size ≤ L for a given integer L ≥ 0. The Vertex Cover Problem is one of the classic NP-complete problems.
We define below formulas F V , F C , and F G that will help build a many-one reduction from VC to the reflected fragments of justification logics. These formulas will include large conjunctions. To avoid the dependence of derivations on a vertex cover, we will use balanced conjunctions (see [8] Clearly, a balanced conjunction of depth k is also a balanced conjunction of depth l for any 0 ≤ l ≤ k. Thus, we are mainly interested in how deeply a given formula is conjunctively balanced. Unless stated otherwise, for any conjunction
k formulas, we assume that the omitted parentheses are such that the resulting balanced conjunction has the maximal possible depth, i.e., depth ≥ k.
We also need to refer to C i 's that form a conjunction C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C 2 k . The following inductive definition of depth k conjuncts, or simply k-conjuncts, generalizes the definition of conjuncts in an ordinary conjunction: Definition 11. Each formula is a 0-conjunct of itself. If C ∧ D is a k-conjunct of a formula F, then C and D are both (k + 1)-conjuncts of F.
For instance, the conjuncts of an ordinary conjunction are its 1-conjuncts; all C i 's in C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C 2 k are its k-conjuncts. More generally, any balanced conjunction of depth k has exactly 2 k occurrences of k-conjuncts (with possibly several occurrences of the same formula).
To make a full use of balanced conjunctions, it is convenient to restrict attention to instances of the Vertex Cover Problem for graphs in which both the number of vertices and the number of edges are powers of 2. These are called binary exponential graphs. It is also helpful to only consider vertex covers whose size is a power of 2; these we call binary exponential vertex covers. Fortunately, the version of the Vertex Cover Problem restricted to binary exponential graphs and their binary exponential vertex covers is also NP-complete:
Theorem 12. The Binary Vertex Cover (BVC) Problem of determining whether a given binary exponential graph G has a vertex cover of size
Proof. Since each instance of BVC is also an instance of the standard VC problem, and since VC is NP-complete, it suffices to construct a polynomial-time many-one reduction from VC to BVC. Suppose we are given an instance of VC; namely, we are given a graph G 0 and an integer L and wish to determine if G 0 has a vertex cover of size ≤ L. We give a polynomial-time procedure that constructs a binary exponential graph G and a value l so that G 0 has a vertex cover of size ≤ L iff G has a vertex cover of size ≤ 2 l . The graph G is constructed in three stages; each stage causes only a constant factor increase in the size of the graph.
Stage 1. Increasing the size of vertex covers.
′ new vertices broken into L ′ disjoint pairs with the vertices in each pair joined by a new edge (L ′ new edges overall). The graph G 0 has a vertex cover of size ≤ L iff the graph G ′ has a vertex cover of size ≤ 2 l − 1. 
Stage 2. Increasing the number of edges. Choose an integer 0
< M ′′ ≤ |E ′ | such that |E ′ | + M ′′ = 2 m for some integer m ≥ 0. A graph G ′′ = V ′′ ,
Stage 3. Increasing the number of vertices. Choose an integer 0
It is clear from the construction that G is a binary exponential graph such that G 0 has a vertex cover of size ≤ L iff G has a vertex cover of size ≤ 2 l .
Definition 13. Let G = V, E be a binary exponential graph with E = {e 1 , . . . , e 2 m }. We define the following formulas:
b. Let C = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i 2 l } ⊆ V be a possible binary exponential vertex cover for G, where
The proof of the following properties is an easy exercise (⊢ denotes derivability in classical propositional logic):
Lemma 14. For any binary exponential graph G = V, E and any binary exponential
Our goal is to reduce BVC to derivability in a given reflected fragment. To this end, we consider a particular derivation of F V → F G that proceeds by first proving F V → F C , then attempting to prove F C → F G , succeeding in the attempt iff C is a vertex cover, and finally applying hypothetical syllogism (HS) to infer F V → F G . We further encode this derivation as a justification term t so that rJL CS ⊢ t : (F V → F G ) iff C is a vertex cover. In BVC we need to determine whether there exists a vertex cover of (at most) a given size rather than whether a given set of vertices is a vertex cover. Thus, t : (F V → F G ) should not depend on C but may (and should) depend on the size of C. Since C has already been "syllogized away" from the formula F V → F G , it remains to make sure that the term t only depends on the size of C. Although any derivations of F V → F C and of F C → F G necessarily explicitly depend on C, the terms encoding them, and therefore t, can be made independent of C. This is the main reason why we use balanced conjunctions: this way all k-conjuncts are interchangeable.
Instead of giving a proof for one particular type of reflected fragments and explaining how to adjust it to other cases as in [10] , we will now formulate conditions under which a reflected fragment fits our construction. These conditions have the following form: for certain individual axiom schemes or their sets there must exist a term that justifies exactly the axioms from this scheme or this set of schemes respectively.
Definition 15.
A reflected fragment rJL CS is called fitting if it has ground terms with the following properties:
where X, Y, Z, X 1 , and X 2 are arbitrary formulas.
Most natural schematically injective constant specifications for justification logics yield fitting reflected fragments. Note that terms c 1 , c 2 , and c ∧ should justify exactly one commonly used propositional axiom scheme each. In fact, if these axiom schemes are part of A1 for a particular justification logic JL and if CS is schematically injective, these terms may have an especially simple form: they can be constants justifying their respective axiom schemes. The two terms c ∧1,∧2 and c ∨1,∨2 should justify two commonly used axiom schemes each. In general, they can be modeled by the sums of terms corresponding to those axiom schemes. That is to say, c ∧1,∧2 can be defined to be c ∧1 + c ∧2 , where c ∧i justifies exactly the scheme X 1 ∧ X 2 → X i . Similarly, c ∨1,∨2 can generally be set equal to c ∨1 + c ∨2 for appropriate terms c ∨1 and c ∨2 .
We shall prove the NP-hardness of fitting reflected fragments by giving a reduction from BVC to derivability in the reflected fragment. Therefore, our complexity lower bounds hold for any fitting reflected logic, and they do not depend on the particular propositional axiomatization chosen, or the particular form of the five terms from (1). In fact, as will be shown, it is not even important that the operation + be present.
Justification Terms Encoding Propositional Reasoning
Throughout the section, we assume that a reflected fragment rJL CS is fitting. All * -derivations in this and the next two sections can be performed in either of the * -calculi. In each case, the choice of the * -calculus is made based on the underlying reflected fragment according to Table 2 .
The size of terms is defined in a standard way: |c| = |x| = 1 for any constant c and any
Note that all the terms from (1) have size O(1) because there are only five of them.
Lemma 16 (Encoding the Hypothetical Syllogism Rule). The operation
Proof. (⇐=). Here are the key elements of a derivation of t : (A → B), s : (B → C) ⊢ syl(t, s) : (A → C) (parts of the derivation following from the "fit" of the reflected fragment are omitted): 1.
To make the applications of the rule * A2 work in lines 3, 5, and 7, the unification variables have to satisfy the following equations:
By (2) and (3),
This equation combined with (4) and (5) shows that H is indeed an implication that follows by HS from X t and X s justified by t and s respectively.
Lemma 17 (Stripping k conjunctions). For any integer k ≥ 0 there exists a term t k of size O(k) that encodes the operation of stripping k conjunctions, i.e.,
Proof. We prove by induction on k that the conditions are satisfied for
Since
If C is a 0-conjunct of H, then H = C, and it is easy to see that t 0 corresponds to the standard derivation of the tautology C → C from propositional axioms (cf. combinator skk). (=⇒). Any * -derivation of t 0 : D must have the following key elements:
For * A2 from line 5 to be valid, it is necessary that D = X 2 → Z 2 . It follows from * A2 in line 3 that
which is an implication from a formula to its 0-conjunct.
Induction step. (⇐=)
. Let H be a formula with a (k + 1)-conjunct C. Then H must be of the form H 1 ∧ H 2 with C being a k-conjunct of H i for some i = 1, 2. By the induction hypothesis, rJL CS ⊢ t k : (H i → C) for this i. For both i = 1 and i = 2 rJL CS ⊢ (c ∧1,∧2 ) : (H → H i ). Then, by Lemma 16, rJL CS ⊢ t k+1 : (H → C). (=⇒). By the induction hypothesis, t k justifies only implications from a formula to one of its k-conjuncts. Since rJL CS is fitting, c ∧1,∧2 justifies only implications from a formula to one of its 1-conjuncts. By Lemma 16, t k+1 justifies only hypothetical syllogisms obtained from the latter and the former, but a k-conjunct of a 1-conjunct of a formula is its (k + 1)-conjunct.
Lemma 18. For any term s and any integer l
l with the following property:
Proof. We prove by induction on l that the conditions are satisfied for
It is not hard to see that |conj(s, 
Induction step. (⇐=). Let
By the induction hypothesis,
In addition,
From (8) and (6) by Lemma 16, for s ′ = syl(conj(s, l), c ∧ ) we have
Then, from (7) and rJL CS ⊢ c 2 : H) ) and, finally,
It remains to note that conj(s, l
is admissible in both * -calculi. So any * -derivation of conj(s, l + 1) : D must contain the following key elements (we have already incorporated the induction hypothesis about conj(s, l) as well as Lemma 16):
where rJL CS ⊢ s : (B → C i ) and rJL CS ⊢ s : (B ′ → C 2 l +i ) for i = 1, . . . , 2 l . Let us collect all unification equations necessary for this to be a valid fragment of a * -derivation:
By (10) and (11),
again by (10) and (11) . So, by (9) and (10),
By ( Proof. Easily follows from the fact that the reflected fragment is fitting.
Reduction from Vertex Cover, Part I
We now use the justification terms from the previous section to build a polynomial-time many-one reduction from BVC to a fitting reflected fragment rJL CS .
Lemma 20. Let a term of size O k2
l be defined by
For any binary exponential graph G = V, E with |V| = 2 k and any set C ⊆ V of size 2 l , 
Lemma 21. Let a term of size O(l) be defined by
t l→edge = syl(t l , disj) .
For any binary exponential graph G = V, E , any set C ⊆ V of size 2
l , and any edge e ∈ E,
⇐⇒ e is covered by C. 
Note that the term t k→l→m depends only on size 2 l of a vertex cover and on how many vertices and edges G has.
Reduction from Vertex Cover, Part II
To finish the polynomial-time reduction from BVC to any fitting reflected fragment rJL CS it now remains to prove the other direction:
=⇒ G has a vertex cover of size ≤ 2 l .
Lemma 24 (Converse to Lemma 20). rJL CS ⊢ t k→l : H =⇒ H = B → D, where D is a balanced conjunction of depth ≥ l whose all l-conjuncts are k-conjuncts of B.
Proof. By definition, t k→l = conj(t k , l), so by Lemma 18, it justifies only implications B → C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C 2 l with rJL CS ⊢ t k : (B → C i ) for i = 1, . . . , 2 l . By Lemma 17, the term t k justifies only implications from a formula to its k-conjuncts.
Lemma 25 (Converse to Lemma 21).
Proof. By definition, Lemma 26 (Converse to Lemma 22) . Theorem 27 (Converse to Theorem 23). 
Proof. The ⇐=-direction was proved in Theorem 23. We now prove the =⇒-direction. F V → F G already has the form prescribed by Theorem 27. The only k-conjuncts of F V are the sentence letters p 1 , . . . , p 2 k . Therefore, there must exist a set X of ≤ 2 l of these sentence letters such that for each m-conjunct F e of F G at least one of the disjuncts of F e , i.e., either p v 1 (e) or p v 2 (e) , is in X. This literally means that G has a set of ≤ 2 l vertices that covers all the edges of G.
Lower Bounds for Reflected Fragments Theorem 29. For any fitting reflected fragment rJL CS , derivability in rJL CS is NP-hard.
Proof. It is easy to see that both F V and F G have size polynomial in the size of G.
As for the term t k→l→m , it was shown in Theorem 23 that
, which is polynomial in the size of G provided l ≤ k (BVC for l > k is trivial). Thus, Theorem 28 shows that rJL CS is NP-hard.
It is time now to reap the fruits of the preceding theorem by showing that a wide range of constant specifications produce fitting reflected fragments.
In the following proof, we need to perform operations on schemes of formulas rather than on individual formulas. Thus, it is convenient to represent axiom schemes using the Substitution Rule:
where σ is any substitution of formulas for sentence letters (see, for instance, formulation of classical propositional logic in [11, Sect. 1.3] ). In justification logics, we additionally have to allow substitutions σ to replace justification variables with justification terms. The Substitution Rule allows to make axiomatizations finite because each axiom scheme can be replaced by a single axiom A such that each of infinitely many instances of the axiom scheme is a substitution instance of A. Note that in general we cannot use this representation to define JL CS because CS need not be schematic. It is easy to see that Lemma 30 (Substitution Property, [2, 3, 4] ). The Substitution Rule is admissible for a justification logic JL CS , and hence for rJL CS , iff CS is schematic.
Strictly speaking, we presented axioms schemes (e.g., for LP) using variables over formulas and variables over terms, e.g., t : F → F is understood in the sense that it is an axiom for any term t and any formula F. Each axiom scheme written in this way can be easily converted to an axiom in the corresponding system with the Substitution Rule by replacing distinct variables over formulas by distinct sentence letters and distinct variables over terms by distinct justification variables, e.g., the scheme t : F → F becomes a formula x : p → p. The latter will be called a most general instance (mgi) of the former (note that an mgi is not unique: the choice of sentence letters and justification variables plays no role).
By analogy with axiom schemes, a scheme of formulas with an mgi F is the set {Fσ | σ is a substitution} .
Lemma 31. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP}. Any schematically injective and axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS for JL yields a fitting reflected fragment rJL CS .
Proof. All formulas that fit the five patterns from (1) can be broken into seven schemes of propositional tautologies with mgi's
where p, q, r, p 1 , and p 2 are distinct sentence letters (strictly speaking, we should have used a distinct set of sentence letters for each mgi). Let A stand for any of these seven mgi's. For each JL, its axiomatization contains A1, i.e., a full axiomatization of classical propositional logic. Therefore, the propositional tautology A is a theorem of JL CS . Since CS is axiomatically appropriate, by Lemma 4, there exists a term s, which contains neither + nor any justification variables, such that JL CS ⊢ s : A, and hence rJL CS ⊢ s : A. By the Substitution Property (Lemma 30), rJL CS ⊢ Aσ for any substitution σ. In other words, the term s satisfies (1) in the ⇐=-direction for the respective axiom scheme. For the =⇒-direction, it is sufficient to note that for any +-free ground term t the set CS(t) = {F | rJL CS ⊢ t : F} is either empty or a scheme whose mgi we will denote by A t . This statement can be proved by induction on the size of t. For constants, it is guaranteed by the schematic injectivity of CS. Justification variables do not occur in ground terms. If CS(t ′ ) is empty, so is CS(! t ′ ). Otherwise, for logics with * ! CS as their * -calculus,
The last equality follows from the fact that t ′ does not contain variables. Thus, in this case
In the logics with * CS as their * -calculus, the same argument works for t ′ = ! · · · ! n c, n ≥ 0, whereas for all other terms, CS(! t ′ ) = ∅ independent of CS(t ′ ).
Finally,
It follows from Theorem 8 that A t 1 cannot be a single sentence letter. Clearly, if the main connective of A t 1 is not an implication, then CS(t 1 · t 2 ) = ∅. It remains to consider the case A t 1 = B → C. If B cannot be unified with A t 2 , then CS(t 1 · t 2 ) = ∅. Otherwise, there must exist a most common unifier (mgu) τ = mgu(B, A t 2 ). Any formula F in (21) must be a substitution instance of both B and A t 2 . Hence there must exist a substitution σ such that F = Bτσ = A t 2 τσ. Accordingly, any formula G ∈ CS(t 1 · t 2 ) must have the form Cτσ. It follows that CS(t 1 · t 2 ) = {Cτσ | σ is a substitution}. Thus, in this case, A t 1 ·t 2 = Cτ = C mgu(B, A t 2 ). Clearly, the operation +, which enables us to combine several different schemes, would have broken this pattern, but it does not occur in t. Thus, our term s must justify some scheme, of which the formula A is an instance, i.e., A = A s σ for some substitution σ. It can be checked that, if Bσ = A and B is a tautology, then B = A. Hence, A s = A by Theorem 8.
Therefore, the ground term s justifies exactly the scheme with mgi A. This discussion shows that there exist terms c 1 , c 2 , and c ∧ that justify exactly the schemes with mgi's (13), (14) , and (17) respectively, as well as terms c ∧1 , c ∧2 , c ∨1 , and c ∨2 for the schemes with mgi's (15), (16) , (18) , and (19) respectively. It remains to note that the term c ∨1 + c ∨2 satisfies all the requirements of c ∨1,∨2 and the term c ∧1 + c ∧2 fits the role of c ∧1,∧2 .
Theorem 32. Let CS be a schematically injective and axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP}. Then derivability in rJL CS is NP-complete.
Proof. It was proved in [14, 17] that rJL CS is in NP. By Lemma 31, rJL CS is fitting. Thus, by Theorem 28, rJL CS is NP-hard.
Reflected Justification Logics with Hypotheses
The goal of this section is to extend the * -calculi to situations where rJL is augmented with additional axioms. This will be important for the proof of Theorem 43 in the next section that shows the Π p 2 -hardness of the Derivability Problems for pure justification logics.
Some proofs in this section will be semantic. Accordingly, we introduce the simplest semantics for pure justification logics, that of symbolic models, also called Mkrtychev models or simply M-models. This semantics was first introduced for LP by Alexey Mkrtychev in [22] and extended to other pure justification logics in [15] .
Definition 33. Let CS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}. An M-model for JL CS is a pair M = V, A , where V is a propositional valuation and A is an admissible evidence function for JL CS . Informally, an admissible evidence function specifies for each term t and formula F whether t is considered admissible evidence for F. If A(t, F) = True, we say that A satisfies t : F. Being satisfied by A is one of the criteria necessary for t : F to hold in an M-model.
Formally, a function A : Tm × Fm → {True, False} is called an admissible evidence function for a justification logic JL CS iff it is closed under deduction in the * -calculus for the reflected fragment rJL CS (see Table 2 ). That is to say, if an admissible evidence function A satisfies a set X of justification assertions and X ⊢ * s : G in the respective * -calculus, then A must also satisfy s :G. In addition, if JL ∈ {JD, JD4}, an admissible evidence function for JL CS must satisfy the following condition: A(t, ⊥) = False for all terms t. We will use A(t, F) as an abbreviation for A(t, F) = True and also ¬A(t, F) as an abbreviation for A(t, F) = False.
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Finally, the truth relation M H is defined as follows:
M P iff V(P) = True; Boolean connectives behave classically;
Let CS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL and Γ be any set of formulas. We write JL CS {Γ} to denote the closure of JL CS ∪ Γ under modus ponens. It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds for JL CS , and hence we have that
Definition 34. Suppose that every formula in Γ has the form t : A, i.e., Γ consists only of justification assertions. We define the following calculi: * CS+Γ = * CS + Γ and * ! CS+Γ = * ! CS + Γ .
That is to say, in each case the set of axioms is extended by all justification assertions from Γ while the rules remain the same and can be freely applied to the new axioms.
When the type of a * -calculus and a particular CS are clear from the context or when they can be arbitrary, we will use the term * Γ -calculus.
It is natural to ask whether a given * Γ -calculus can prove every formula in the reflected fragment of JL CS {Γ} for the respective JL CS . Unfortunately, there are cases where this does not hold. As an example from Kuznets [17] , consider the situation for LP CS where Γ = {c : p, c : ¬p}. Then, via the Factivity Axiom, LP CS {Γ} is inconsistent, whereas there are certainly justification assertions that cannot be proved in the * ! CS+Γ -calculus. Thus, we need additional restrictions on Γ. For this, we introduce the following Definition 35. A set of justification assertions Γ is called factive provided that, whenever t : A ∈ Γ, either (a) A is of the form s : B and A ∈ Γ or (b) A is a purely propositional 12 formula. The set of purely propositional formulas A such that t : A ∈ Γ for some term t is called the propositional content of Γ, and is denoted Prop(Γ). We call a factive set Γ consistent provided Prop(Γ) is (propositionally) consistent. Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1 from [14] , which in turn uses constructions of Mkrtychev [22] . The ⇐=-direction follows from the fact that any * Γ -derivation can be easily converted into a derivation in JL CS {Γ}. Indeed, all axioms of the * Γ -calculus are either instances of axiom internalization in JL CS or members of Γ and hence axioms of JL CS {Γ}. Each rule in * Γ -calculus translates into the corresponding axiom of JL followed by one or two applications of modus ponens.
We prove the =⇒-direction by showing its contrapositive. Suppose * Γ t : F. Let the function A Γ : Tm × Fm → {True, False} be defined by
For JL ∈ {J, JD, JT}, whereby * Γ = * CS+Γ , it is clear that A Γ is an admissible evidence function for JT CS ; similarly, for JL ∈ {J4, JD4, LP}, when * Γ = * ! CS+Γ , we have that A Γ is an admissible evidence function for LP CS . Note that any constant specification for J or JD can also serve as a constant specification for JT because all axioms of J and JD are also axioms of JT. Similarly, if a constant specification can be used for J4 or JD4, it can also be used for LP. In either case, by definition A Γ satisfies all justification assertions from Γ but does not satisfy t : F by our assumption. Since Γ is consistent, there exists a propositional valuation V that satisfies Prop(Γ). Consider the M-model M = V, A Γ for JT CS or for LP CS respectively. Note that M t : F since ¬A Γ (t, F). In addition, for either JT CS or LP CS we can prove that M Γ. Indeed, it is easy to show by induction on k that M s k : . . . : s 1 : G for each s k : . . . : s 1 : G ∈ Γ, where G is a purely propositional formula. The base case, k = 1, follows from G ∈ Prop(Γ).
The existence of a JT CS -model (an LP CS -model) where all formulas from Γ hold while t : F is false shows that JT CS {Γ} t : F (respectively LP CS {Γ} t : F). But every J CS -or JD CS -derivation is also a JT CS -derivation (for the same CS); similarly, any J4 CS -or JD4 CS -derivation is also an LP CS -derivation. Hence JL CS {Γ} t : F. This completes the proof of Theorem 36.
By analogy with rJL CS we will denote the reflected fragment of JL CS {Γ}
As we proved, rJL CS {Γ} is axiomatized by its respective * Γ -calculus. Note that the only difference between a * -calculus and its corresponding * Γ -calculus is the addition of axioms Γ. Therefore, a reflected fragment rJL CS {Γ} is axiomatized by the same * -calculus as rJL CS as far as rules are concerned. Consequently, there are still only two sets of rules chosen based on whether full positive introspection holds in JL. The differences between these * -calculi, as in the case of rJL CS , is in their axioms. As a consequence of the above construction, other results that N. Krupski [14] established for LP CS also hold for JL CS {Γ}. First, by the minimality of the admissible evidence function A Γ , the disjunction property for formulas of the form s : F∨t :G holds for JL CS {Γ} (cf. Corollary 2 of [14] ). Similarly, if CS is schematic (and polynomially decidable) and Γ is finite, then the Derivability Problem for a * Γ -calculus is in NP for either of the calculi, i.e., rJL CS {Γ} is in NP. This is proved by a construction similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.2 in [14] , the main difference being that derivations in rJL CS {Γ} correspond to rJL CS -derivations from hypotheses Γ, whereas N. Krupski considered only derivations without hypotheses.
For us, the importance of Theorem 36 lies in the fact that the results of Sects. 3-5 translate to rJL CS {Γ} for a proper subclass of consistent factive sets Γ.
Lemma 37. Let CS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} such that the reflected fragment rJL CS is fitting. Let Γ be a consistent factive set of justification assertions such that the only terms that occur in Γ are justification variables. Then 21, 22, 25 , and 26 all still hold if rJL CS is uniformly replaced by rJL CS {Γ} in the statements of the lemmas.
Proof. Since any derivation in rJL CS is also a derivation in rJL CS {Γ}, the proofs of the ⇐=-directions in all these lemmas do not require any changes. The =⇒-directions also hold because the only terms that gain additional provably justified formulas in rJL CS {Γ} are those that contain justification variables from Γ, but no variables have been used for construction of the terms in the proofs of all these lemmas.
A Lower Bound for Full Justification Logics
Sections 4 and 5 established a reduction from the Vertex Cover Problem to the Derivability Problem in a given reflected fragment thereby proving NP-hardness of the latter. In the present section, we extend the proof method and obtain stronger lower bounds for full (non-reflected) pure justification logics JL CS . 13 We first prove that a quantified version of the Vertex Cover Problem is Π p 2 -hard by reducing co-QSAT 2 to it. Then we reduce this Quantified Vertex Cover Problem to the Derivability Problem in a given justification logic.
Definition 38. By co-QSAT 2 we mean the following problem. Let ϕ be any 3CNF formula, i.e., a propositional formula in conjunctive normal form with exactly three literals in each clause. Given such a ϕ with its sentence letters partitioned into two sets p = {p 1 , . . . , p | p | } and q = {q 1 , . . . , q | q | }, determine whether
is true.
The following theorem is standard. Several of its slightly different variants can be found, for instance, in [23, 24, 25] .
be a formula of type (23) , where each C i is a 3-clause:
Given ψ we construct a graph G ψ = V ψ , E ψ with vertices labeled by literals (the construction is identical with the reduction of 3SAT to VC as given in [13] ). The graph is defined as follows: • For each sentence letter p j , there are two vertices u j,0 and u j,1 joined by an edge. The vertex u j,0 is labeled with p j and u j,1 is labeled with ¬p j . These are also called literal vertices and literal edges.
• A clause vertex and a literal vertex are joined by a connecting edge iff they are labeled by the same literal. 13 Applying this method to hybrid logics does not make sense since they are mostly at least PSPACE-hard by virtue of being conservative over the corresponding modal logic. As for S5 1 LP, the only hybrid logic that may not be PSPACE-hard, its conservativity over LP would easily yield the lower bound that can be obtained by our method.
There are 3r + 2N vertices in G ψ , where N = | p | + | q |; namely, 3r clause vertices and 2N literal vertices. Similarly, there are 6r + N edges in G ψ ; namely, 3r clause edges, N literal edges, and 3r connecting edges.
As is argued in [13] , G ψ has a vertex cover of size ≤ 2r + N iff ϕ is satisfiable. First, any vertex cover of G ψ must have at least 2r + N vertices since a vertex cover must contain at least one vertex for each literal edge and at least two vertices from each clause triangle. Second, since any vertex cover C of size 2r + N must contain exactly one literal vertex per literal edge in the graph, it is possible to define a propositional valuation τ C by letting τ C (L) = True for exactly those literals that label literal vertices from the vertex cover. It is not hard to see that this valuation τ C satisfies ϕ. Conversely, if τ is any valuation that satisfies ϕ, then there exists a vertex cover C of size 2r + N such that τ = τ C .
Definition 40. Let π denote a (partial) valuation with domain p. A vertex cover C of G ψ is called its π-cover if C contains all literal vertices labeled by literals from the set
where p j is a sentence letter that corresponds to the literal vertex u j,0 and p j is a sentence letter that corresponds to the literal vertex u j,1 . Intuitively, the sentence letter p j in the encoding corresponds to the literal p j in the formula ψ while the sentence letter p j corresponds to the literal ¬p j , which explains the chosen notation. We hope that the resulting small collision of notation: p j is the sentence letter that encodes the literal vertex that corresponds to the literal p j , will facilitate understanding rather than hinder it. Let γ ψ be the conjunction of the formulas in Γ ψ . (Unlike the other conjunctions we work with, γ ψ need not be balanced.) Let V ′ ψ be the set of all vertices of G ′ ψ , and let
k is a power of two. We define K ψ to be
where a term t ′ k→l→m plays a role similar to t k→l→m and is defined below. To prove Theorem 43 it will suffice to show that JL CS ⊢ K ψ iff ψ is true.
By the deduction theorem,
For any valuation π with domain p, define
and let Γ ψ,π be the set of formulas {x : L | L ∈ V π }. Note that for any valuation π with domain p the set Γ ψ,π is a finite consistent factive set of justification assertions and the only term that occurs in it is the justification variable x. Hence, by Lemma 37, for any valuation π with domain p, 21, 22, 25 , and 26 hold for JL CS {Γ ψ,π }. Consider the assertions
Clearly, (24) 
where by the derivability in rJL CS {Γ ψ,π } we understand the derivability in the corresponding * Γ ψ,π -calculus.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is very much like the proof of Theorem 28, but we still need to define the term t 
Indeed, by Lemma 17, The converse is proved in a way similar to Lemma 24. In particular, by Lemma 18, rJL CS {Γ ψ,π } ⊢ t
The Role of CS
Our method for proving lower bounds for both justification logics and their reflected fragments as well as Milnikel's original proof of the lower bound for LP CS from [21] require CS to be axiomatically appropriate and schematically injective. A natural question arises: whether these two conditions on CS are essential for proving the lower bounds? In particular, is LP itself Π p 2 -hard? Although we cannot answer the latter question, in this section we will try to explore the dependency of the lower bound on a constant specification.
It is clear that neither schematic injectivity nor axiomatic appropriateness are necessary for the lower bounds to hold. In particular, Lemma 47. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP}. There exists a constant specification CS for JL that is neither schematically injective nor axiomatically appropriate such that rJL CS is NP-hard. If JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}, then, in addition, JL CS is Π p 2 -hard. Proof. Let terms c 1 , c 2 , c ∧1,∧2 , c ∧ , and c ∨1,∨2 from (1) be constants. Let all tautologies from the right sides of the five equivalencies in (1) be axioms from A1. Finally, let a constant specification CS be such that all five equivalencies from (1) hold while no other constant justifies any axioms at all. Then the reflected fragment rJL CS is clearly fitting. Thus, by Theorem 29, rJL CS is NP-hard. In addition, if JL is a pure justification logic, by Theorem 43, JL CS is Π p 2 -hard. At the same time, this CS is surely not axiomatically appropriate. It is not schematically injective either since constants c ∧1,∧2 and c ∨1,∨2 justify two axiom schemes each.
The constructed constant specification is schematic, but even the schematicness condition is easy to violate provided the constants c 1 , c 2 , c ∧1,∧2 , c ∧ , and c ∨1,∨2 remain schematic. It should noted that schematicness is often needed to prove the matching upper bound.
The constant specification from the proof of the previous lemma also demonstrates another curious fact: the +-operation does not play a big role in the lower bound on the complexity of the logic.
Lemma 48. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP}. There exists a constant specification CS such that the +-free reflected fragment of JL CS is NP-hard.
Proof. Although + was used to construct terms c ∧1,∧2 and c ∨1,∨2 for schematically injective constant specifications, it is not required for the constant specification CS from the proof of Lemma 47. Nowhere else in our reduction was + used. Therefore, even if axiom A3 and rule * A3 are omitted from the axiomatizations of JL and of its reflected fragment respectively and the operation + is dropped from the language completely (see [12] for precise definitions) the resulting +-free reflected fragment is still fitting and, hence, NP-hard.
However, the ability of one term to justify several axiom schemes does seem to be necessary for the proven lower bounds. This ability can be ensured already on the level of constants, without the use of +. However, if the lack of + is coupled with the schematic injectivity of a constant specification, then all terms effectively become schematically injective and the reflected fragment is polynomially decidable, which can be shown by analyzing N. Krupski's algorithm from [14] .
The preceding discussion shows that the lower bounds are, in some sense, local. Namely, they can be ensured by finitely many constants using only a small portion of propositional reasoning. In fact, the proof of the existence of undecidable LP CS from [16] has a similar flavor: only a few constants are sufficient to make the logic undecidable. For instance, it is possible that JL CS can be shown to be Π p 2 -hard using one part of the constant specification CS and to be undecidable using another part. Therefore, the requirements of schematicness and/or schematic injectivity can be relaxed to apply only to a small subset of justification constants.
Since axiomatic appropriateness is also a local property, it becomes clear that it is independent of whether the reflected fragment is fitting. In particular, Lemma 47 can be easily reformulated for an axiomatically appropriate but not schematically injective constant specification. The only change in the proof would be an addition of a sixth constant that proves all the axioms.
However little of internalization is used in the proof of our lower bounds, it cannot be dispensed of completely:
Lemma 49. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, T n LP, S4 n LP, S5 n LP}. There exists a schematically injective but not axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS for JL such that rJL CS is in P. If JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, LP}, then, in addition, JL CS is in co-NP.
Proof. It has been known that LP 0 with the empty constant specification CS = ∅ is in co-NP. Its reflected fragment is trivially in P since it is empty. Extending these results to other justification logics is straightforward.
The preceding lemma can also be proved using a non-empty schematically injective constant specification, but the proof is much more involved.
